constitutionally obliged to step down, proved a politically fatal mistake. Credible opposition leaders were in place and these combined with a plethora of non-state actors to inspire and mobilize tens of thousands to protest in the streets, ultimately leading to Shevardnadze's premature departure from office. In Kyrgyzstan the large crowds assembled to challenge the election results, although never reaching the levels witnessed in Kyiv and Tbilisi, were mainly to be found in peripheral towns and cities in the south and took the form of a popular uprising, temporarily displacing government officials and structures with 'revolutionary' ones. When Akaev went ahead and opened the new parliament on 22 March he was quickly dislodged from the 'White House' (the seat of government) by an angry mob and soon found himself on a plane to Moscow and political obscurity.
In this essay I identify the factors that influenced the timing and nature of the anti-regime efforts in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan that culminated in what are known as the Rose and Tulip revolutions.
I inspect the role that political elites and personalities played in the unfolding dramas and evaluate the extent to which the media, youth groups and regional power bases helped or hindered the anti-government struggle. More specifically, I challenge two assumptions popular among analysts of the coloured revolution phenomenon. The first of these is the argument that opposition unity was a prerequisite for the presidents' overthrow : as will become clear, opposition parties found it too difficult to coordinate their actions and their leaders could not agree how best to challenge the election results. The second is the contention that the Rose and Tulip revolutions were orchestrated by Western agencies that sought to induce a change of government so as to further US interests in the region.
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The Regimes
As has been pointed out elsewhere, revolutionaries rarely make revolutions, governments do . 1 Shevardnadze's Georgia and Akaev's Kyrgyzstan fell considerably short of strong post-soviet authoritarian states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan. Whether we call them partial democracies, hybrid democracies or competitive authoritarian regimes, the Georgian and Kyrgyz states never of his closest advisors recalls, 'was like committing suicide four times'. 2 Many suspected that Shevardnadze would devise some way of preserving his interests and influence, perhaps by making constitutional changes and appointing a loyal successor . 3 The United States and several European countries, particularly Germany, had generously supported Shevardnadze, and this was complemented by aid from international organizations aimed at facilitating democratization efforts in Georgia. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, Georgia Ó Beacháin : 4 was one of the largest recipients of US aid per capita in the world. After the 2000 elections, however, there was a noticeable dampening of enthusiasm for Shevardnadze in the West, although important military assistance was given to help Georgia meet challenges in the Pankiski gorge. 4 In 2003, however, the US announced funding cuts and the International Monetary Fund declared that it was suspending assistance to the Shevardnadze government. 5 Funding for nongovernmental organizations in Georgia remained constant.
In Kygyzstan, President Akaev, a politician by accident, had liberal instincts, reinforced by his country's lack of natural resources. Surrounded by poor or unfriendly states and with no oil to sell to the West, Akaev decided early on that his best bet was to offer America a democratic success story. With a range of progressive legislation introduced in the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan achieved a string of notable firsts in the Commonwealth of Independent States: it was the first state to privatize land, the first to break with the rouble and establish its own currency (1993) , and the it became clear that the regime had turned into merely a corrupt oligarchy. The greed of Akaev's family and allied clans grew as the economy declined. By the end, Akaev had lost the support of democrats, the intelligentsia and the south, and was increasingly beholden to a narrow stratum of northern clans. However, like Shevardnadze, Akaev managed to deflect the worst of the odium to his closest associates. Many believed that, while Akaev himself was a fundamentally decent person, he was unable to control the excesses of his wife, his children, and political hangers-on.
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In both countries there existed a general sense that the national interest was being pawned or sold to the highest bidder. The sale of Georgia's gas-distribution network to the Russian United Energy Systems in 2003 aroused criticism. 7 Although the sale was occasioned by the AmericanGeorgian company AES Telasi's desire to raise cash quickly by ridding itself of a troublesome investment, the Georgian government was blamed for failing to step in and purchase a controlling share. 8 As the sale came hot on the heels of Shevardnadze's consent to a 25-year 'strategic cooperation' agreement with Russia's Gazprom, oppositionists portrayed the Shevardnadze regime as either falling back on Russian support to compensate for waning Western approval, or selling off Georgia's national interests simply to stay in power. Shevardnadze's failure to make headway on Abkhazia and South Ossetia was also increasingly attributed to indifference to the national good, which was secondary to managing and maintaining power. Akaev was similarly under fire, particularly in the south, for agreeing to transfer Kyrgyz territories, 90,000 hectares in all, to
China. The presence of both US and Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan, while extolled as profitable pragmatism, was also viewed by some as political prostitution.
Ultimately both the Shevardnadze and the Akaev regimes fell not just because of determined efforts by the opposition, but also because of a lack of will among key state institutions to withstand attack or to defend the regime adequately. The government's unwillingness to use maximum force against the protesters was a crucial ingredient in the opposition's recipe for revolution. According to Ghia Nodia, Shevardnadze may not have been ideologically wedded to the non-violence but could not bring himself to use force when it might have been effective:
He did not want to use force; he counted on that. But as these protests continued and as time passed they gained strength rather than diminished strength -his plan crumbled because of that … morale in the government was eroded, more and more people started to switch sides … After being ousted from parliament I believe he was ready finally, psychologically ready, to use force but by that stage he simply did not have force to use.
It was too late.
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Having seen security around parliament melt, Shevardnadze went for one last throw of the dice by declaring a state of emergency, but by then he could not command the loyalty of the security apparatus. Police units were defecting to the opposition in large numbers, creating potential for civil conflict had Shevardnadze not resigned promptly.
The Tulip revolution followed the Georgian script with a Kyrgyz twist. Although police or army violence could never be entirely ruled out in Kyrgyzstan -these forces had, after all, killed six protesters in the southern town of Aksy in 2002 -few believed that Akaev would embark on a bloody defensive campaign to stay in power. Akaev himself had ruled out the use of force to quell the protests and as late as 20 March the Kyrgyz prime minister, Nikolai Tanaev, assured the public that law-enforcers sent to retake government buildings in the south did not carry weapons. 10 In an effort to avoid bloodshed, Akaev had refused to declare a state of emergency, perhaps because he could not have relied on the entire security apparatus. Unlike Shevardnadze, 17 In what must rank as one of the most bizarre tactics devised to counter a coloured revolution, the Akaev regime manufactured a pro-government youth group also called Kel-Kel within two days of the 'real' Kel-Kel's foundation. The clone proceeded to adopt the same slogans, symbols and website (which was duly given to them) but articulated a different political message. The Akaev regime had studied the rise of similar youth movements in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine and concluded that they should be nipped in the bud.
Media
The independent media have received particular mention as influential actors in facilitating coloured revolutions in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, although their impact, while undoubtedly significant, is difficult to quantify accurately. At the time of the Rose revolution there were numerous low-circulation newspapers in Georgia of varying (though generally low) quality.
Television had (and continues to have) a far greater impact, and Shevardnadze's failed attempts to tame the Rustavi 2 station underlined his weakness and vulnerability to popular disapproval.
18
During the demonstrations, Rustavi 2 abandoned most pretences of objectivity, and through a series of coded messages appeared to embrace the opposition protesters. It advertised in advance the times and places when opposition meetings were to take place, and initially did its best to father, and I -we said 'of course, people want you to stay at home and live a poor simple life'. This is the idea that they want to promote; that the citizen is someone who tends to his daily chores, who thinks about his piece of bread and little else. 21 There was diversity in the Kyrgyzstani print media, but in the last year of his term Akaev put Ó Beacháin : 9 enormous pressure on the three major independent newspapers, largely in the form of crippling libel cases. 22 Freedom House had stepped in to print the papers when they faced boycott from state publishers, but even this manoeuvre was thwarted during the election when Freedom House found its electricity cut off for much of the campaign. 23 In sum, the Georgia media played a critical role in framing the issue of electoral fraud and mobilizing the public while in Kyrgyzstan the state monopolized television and muzzled opposition newspapers.
Opposition Unity
Opposition unity is almost always cited as a fundamental prerequisite for a revolution of the type seen in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, be it called 'electoral' or 'coloured'. In their article, 'Favourable
Conditions and Electoral Revolutions', Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik cite the formation of a unified opposition as the first prerequisite for an electoral revolution. 24 Mark
Bessinger also states that a 'united opposition established in part by foreign prodding' is a basic requirement. 25 Taking the example of Serbia, Marlene Spoerri argues that the formation of a united opposition coalition was a sine qua non for the toppling of Miloševic in 2000. 26 Michael
McFaul makes an important qualification when he states that 'a united opposition -or at least the perception of one -is a … factor that appears crucial for democratic breakthrough'. 27 This is a more modest estimation of the importance of opposition unity, and one that fits more comfortably with any explanation of the Rose and Tulip revolutions when a multitude of opposition leaders vied with each other and where the parties were generally weak, fragmented, disunited and personality-driven.
The lack of opposition unity in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan can partly be explained by the fact that candidates were running in parliamentary and not presidential elections, as was the case in the elections that led to the Serbian Bulldozer Revolution and Ukrainian Orange Revolution. Whereas a unified candidate against an unpopular incumbent could be presented as a necessity in a winnertakes-all presidential contest, the same could not be argued for parliamentary elections. Parties Ó Beacháin : 10 could co-operate but not step aside and could collaborate only to the extent that this did not diminish their popularity, confuse their hard-core constituency, or compromise their party's longer-term interests.
The Georgian election did not offer a decisive victory to any opposition party, and, contrary to subsequent mythologizing, the opposition had not united prior to the election. This was not for want of attempts to get the opposition parties to co-operate with one another, particularly by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), an influential American NGO. However, key elements within the opposition did unite after reports of election fraud filtered out and there was a coordinated protest engineered by Mikheil Saakashvili's National Movement and the Bujanadze Democrats, which included Nino Burjanadze, Zurab Zhvania and Akaki Asatiani. 28 It is necessary to point out, however, that some important parties remained aloof and even attended the opening session of the disputed parliament.
The groups that emerged from the flawed 2003 elections can be put into three categories. The first comprised the parties willing to take to the streets to protest against the voter fraud; these were Therefore, if we are to take the PVT as accurate, the protesting opposition represented less than 40 per cent. At the last moment, the New Rights Party, which had announced that it would join the parliamentary boycott, made a secret pact with Shevardnadze and most of its elected representatives rushed to parliament to provide the quota necessary for opening the disputed legislature . 31 The lack of opposition unity can partially be attributed to Shevardnadze's stature as the dominant political figure in Georgia since 1972, a survivor who seemed politically immortal.
Not all were willing to confront him at this time and many were jockeying for position in anticipation of the presidential contest that was due in just over a year.
Opposition parties in Kyrgyzstan were, by the eve of Akaev's removal, reasonably united on paper but this meant comparatively little in practice given their structural flaws, not least in terms Ó Beacháin : 12 of membership and organization. To a much greater extent than in Georgia, Kyrgyz political parties were devoid of ideological underpinning. In Kyrgyzstan politics divided not on a left-right but on a north-south basis. Moreover, while there were many parties there were not many party members: in 1995, in the whole of Kyrgyzstan, only 13,000 citizens were members of a political party. 32 Parliamentary representation was also notable for the preponderance of 'independents' elected, which some commentators attributed in part to the electoral law that made no provision rather, influence would be secured through patronage networks, and a place in parliament or close to the president was considered preferable to working through a party organization -it was more lucrative and less transparent and no accountability was required except to one's own kin and allies. Thus parliamentarians relied on their clan networks rather than party organizations to propel them to power. For those outside the clan networks, politics seemed particularly futile.
Parties lacked a popular base and real power lay with the regional groups; but, while one could join an open party, the same did not necessarily apply to kin-based clans. These realties were also reflected in turnout; in the Russified and individualistic capital of Bishkek turnout hovered at the 60 per cent mark, whereas clan-dominated regions could engineer figures of more than 90 per Soros, a frequent visitor to Kyrgyzstan and former ally of Akaev in the 1990s, as a bogeyman inciting mawkish youth to rebellion. 37 Moreover, in an interview given shortly after his removal from office Akaev said that, whereas Russia and China had always contributed to Central Asian security and adopted a policy of non-intervention in internal affairs, the same could not be said of the Western powers:
As for the West's influence [on the 24 March events] -this was obvious and it was no secret to anyone … Over the last year in Kyrgyzstan … much work was carried out by numerous international organizations to set in motion the technology of a coloured revolution, so, of course, the prevailing factor here was precisely the West's influence and it prompted the instructors from Ukraine and Georgia, people who already had experience in carrying out an orange [and] a rose revolution, to call in on us. So, my view remains the same; it was the outside factor, the West, of course, and first and foremost the USA. 38 Shevardnadze also lent credibility to the conspiracy theory that Western actors were out to manufacture regime-change when, during the Rose revolution protests, he publicly blamed For many years Georgia had the distinction of being the largest per capita recipient of US aid after
Israel. America received ever-diminishing returns, as corruption thrived and democratization was exposed as a platitude designed to attract aid rather than a real government objective. As a result, six weeks before the 2003 elections the US government announced that it would be cutting aid, on grounds of insufficient reforms in Georgia. 49 A myriad of foreign-funded NGOs undermined and if something happens that means it was somehow imported because we intellectually can somehow not handle this, because we are too stupid to be democratic agents. 51 The director of the Soros Foundation in Georgia, Kakha Lomia, also rejects the Russian view that his organization, in alliance with the US government, plotted to overthrow Shevardnadze. He attributes the popularity of this view to Russia's sense of loss after the Rose Revolution and its fear that Georgia was leaving the Kremlin orbit. 'They were looking for someone to blame', Lomia argues 'and the most convenient target was Soros, a mythological figure in their understanding who was ousted from the Russian Federation, from Uzbekistan, from Belarus, and from Serbia'. In Lomia's view, to blame Soros or 'the West' is a way of denying agency to Georgians, since to suggest otherwise would mean that 'they would have to admit that the major Ó Beacháin : 18 driving force behind these events was the Georgian people … so I think that was their primitive way of underestimating the power of the people'. 52 Rather than being the sites of some grand American strategy for regime change -a softer, betterpackaged, version of the forced democratization projects in Iraq and Afghanistan -the truth was more mundane. In Georgia, the US government adopted a cautious approach throughout the crisis.
Until the end, the US embassy in Tbilisi had identified its role as that of mediator between Shevardnadze and the opposition. Indeed, according to one well-placed observer, the US ambassador 'tried to calm down the revolutionaries and stop them from being too radical'. 53 All the Americans demanded was free and fair elections, but, since the regime did not intend to grant them, US involvement appeared a blatant endorsement of the opposition. Similarly, NDI's training sessions for political parties were unwelcome not because they excluded pro-government parties (they did not) but simply because the government, with its administrative resources, needed assistance least and such training therefore disproportionately benefited opposition parties. What the 'West', broadly defined, certainly did in the run-up to the historic elections was provide modest assistance to a relatively small group of organizations with a remit to bolster civil society, strengthen social capital, and promote transparency, accountability and fairness in government and in the electoral process. 54 They failed almost entirely in the latter objective. Government in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan was more corrupt and less democratic on the eve of the revolutions than a decade earlier despite vast sums of money provided to the Shevardnadze and Akaev regimes. … I am tired of explaining this to people from Europe and the United States -everybody who comes here. … However, they do not want to think about these issues and think we are exaggerating. That is why this year we are going to have blood in our country because the international community could have prevented that but didn't want to do anything. 57 The argument here, therefore, is that it was Western neglect of democracy promotion and not European', which according to one seasoned observer formed 'the core of the anti-Shevardnadze opposition … the major outcome of the revolution is that Georgians have started to feel European again'. 60 The velvet revolution was, after all, associated with Central and Eastern Europe, and by executing a mass non-violent revolution, Georgians had shed the sense that they were a people incapable of resolving their differences peacefully. This re-entry to Europe was symbolized by a new flag that stressed Georgia's Christian character with not one but no fewer than five crosses of Saint George. The EU flag is flown throughout Tbilisi, including outside all major government institutions. 61 Understandably, the European factor played little role in motivating activists in dead. 65 Increasingly, however, Akaev's support for ethnic minorities was rhetorical, his support symbolic rather than substantial, the threat more manufactured for personal gain than an accurate reflection of reality. By the same token, Uzbek and Russian support for Akaev became increasingly formal, more a case of choosing the lesser of two evils than signifying an enthusiastic endorsement.
As his foothold in the north looked increasingly shaky, Akaev made token gestures towards the south by appointing a succession of southerners -although only those with weak clan ties -to the position of prime minister. Kurmanbek Bakiev was one such example, although he was eventually sacrificed to appease pubic outrage arising from the Aksy killings of 2002. It was a cruel irony that to appease southern anger at the killing of protesters in Aksy, the southerners lost 'their' prime minister. Bakiev was replaced by Nikolay Tanayev, an ethnic Russian born in Russia and therefore unlikely to have strong clan allegiances in Kyrgyzstan. In the final analysis, regionalism is an integral feature of Kyrgyzstan's politics and played a decisive role in the overthrow of Akaev. By contrast, the strongest ethnic opponents of Shevardnadze's regime, those in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, were not part of mainstream Georgian politics, and other potentially troublesome minorities had been domesticated.
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The Role of Elites and Personalities
In the literature on coloured revolutions, there has been a marked tendency to focus on the actions of domestic elites. Henry Hale, for example, has advocated that rather than framing research in terms of transitions to democracy or autocracy or dwelling on hybrids in between, we should see events as 'just one swing in a regular cyclical process'. 66 For Hale the key is the presidential term, the observance of term limits and the intention of incumbents. 67 If an incumbent president is stepping down, there will be uncertainty among the elite members who then jockey for position fearing the new dispensation will challenge their interests. 68 With the high stakes in these winnertakes-all contests, elites mobilize everything they can, and in such struggles all resources, including popular mobilization on the street, can be deployed.
However, as has been argued here, the opposition elite could not unite against the regime, and imagine what I will be able to do with real power'. 73 In the heady days that followed the 2003 election Saakashvili alone would not compromise or broker an elite deal that fell short of his maximum demands. He based his power almost exclusively on the crowds he could mobilize to the streets and (more significantly) whom he could inspire to stay throughout several cold November nights. Georgians had endured a long dark night of the soul, in which the whole purpose and value of independence had to be assessed anew. They had won sovereignty but were worse off as a result in every measurable sphere. The drive to vindicate the vote was as much about restoring national self-respect as about securing immediate individual gain. 74 Saakashvili's innovation was to abandon court politics for courting the people. As one of his advisors and election team managers put it:
Saakashvili appeared absolutely different from everyone else; he was the only one who suggested something new … Saakashvili was the first guy who refused to play these [elite power] games. And that gave him his originality … He was the first guy even who would be held to produce a new legislature, the legitimacy of which would be beyond reproach.
By keeping the parliament that Akaev had sought to fashion for his own ends, the new leadership avoided upsetting the incoming parliamentarians who had invested so much in winning their seats but, as so often in the past, exchanged liberty for stability. Far from being a child of the revolution, the parliament was to be the same legislature that Akaev had conceived and delivered.
The democratic impulse was further suppressed when the two major contenders for the presidency, Kurmanbek Bakiev and Felix Kulov, negotiated a pact whereby they would divide the spoils: Bakiev would take the presidency while Kulov would be prime minister. While presented 
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was offered by the Georgian opposition generally, and by Saakashvili in particular, was not new goals but a determined effort to achieve them. As Lincoln Mitchell has argued, the protesters' main demand was for Shevardnadze's resignation and not 'some sweeping change in the country's governing political philosophy'. The goal of securing Shevardnadze's resignation was concrete and achievable, the rest 'all apple-pie'. 77 In Kyrgyzstan, too, the Tulip revolution leaders and organizers lacked a distinctive ideology and were a motley crew with little uniting them save a common will to challenge the elections. Their ranks included regional clans, urban intellectuals, student activists, farmers, nationalists, Russophiles, Western-orientated politicians, and civil society leaders. Each had his or her advocates, but there was no single leader or group that united these disparate interests or channelled their hopes into a coherent call for change.
Conclusion
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan shared many structural conditions that facilitated a coloured revolution:
an unpopular president on the verge of stepping down, electoral irregularities, a reasonably strong civil society complemented by opposition parties, independent media outlets, and Western assistance. Several factors converged to create the necessary conditions for Georgia's Rose revolution. In the twilight of his political career, Shevardnadze presided over a corrupt oligarchy, and when opposition emerged to the rigged elections he miscalculated and underestimated the strength of resistance. Had Shevardnadze chosen to negotiate, he would have found willing partners in Zhvania and Burjanadze, and therefore it was Saakashvili, with his uncompromising stance and bold rhetoric, that caught the popular mood better than rival opposition leaders. Having patiently laid the organizational groundwork , Saakashvili provided vital energy and singularity of focus. At critical moments other opposition leaders vacillated and were unsure whether their objective was to reverse the election results partially or in full, or to effect regime change and fundamental systemic reforms. Saakashvili's strength, however, depended on the large crowds he managed to inspire and mobilize. Opposition unity prior to the revolutions has been overstated. Since these were parliamentary and not presidential elections, the opposition could not simply unite around a single candidate. In Georgia, complete national unity was momentarily achieved after the resignation of Shevardnadze rather than before. Saakashvili received 96 per cent of the vote in the presidential elections of January 2004, although as subsequent events were to demonstrate this overwhelming mandate was rather fragile. Kyrgyzstan not only lacked a united opposition, it was bereft of strong party organizations. While many opposition leaders had united on paper shortly before the Tulip revolution, the parties that they maintained were small and little bound them together save a common will to power and a desire to see Akaev's departure. It soon became evident that Kyrgyzstan's opposition had leap-frogged to power despite a lack of preparation and having been denied some of the structural advantages enjoyed by their counterparts in Georgia and Ukraine. In 
